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SEWARD'S FOLLY, SALMON MANAGEMENT,
AND DISCOUNTING RATES
by
Ray Hilborn, Hilary Lee, Ralf Yorque
Some months ago, the ecology project gave a series of two
IIASA colloquia on some of the approaches to the salmon case study.
Part of the presentations dealt with optimization of various com-
ponents of the salmon system. These optimizations were done using
stochastic dynamic programming. Some members of the audience ex-
pressed concern over the fact that we had used no discounting.
Carl Walters explained that we did this because the management
agencies are charged with management in perpetuity and therefore
any sort of discounting seems a bit inappropriate. Some recent
work has shown that optimal management practice of fisheries is
seriously affected by discounting rates. The standard example
in extremis of this problem has to do with any renewable resource.
If the rate at which the resource grows, be it trees, fish or
whatever, is less than this discounting rate, then simple economics
tell us to completely eliminate the resource. This does ignore the
fact that the value of the resource may increase due to scarcity
as it is eliminated. However, for anyone managing a single salmon
watershed or a forest plot such considerations are insignificant.
Fortunately, salmon have population growth rates well over 50% per
annum, so there is not much chance that economic optimization will
tell us to eliminate all salmon stocks. Many other fisheries, though,
are less productive, and if discounting rates ever stay at 10%
(the official rate in some countries) for very long, we may see
our economist friends advising us to catch all of those silly
fish while they are still worth some money.
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What are reasonable discounting rates? This topic is one of
the most hotly contested at IIASA, but we have yet to see a work-
ing paper or research report address this problem. Some rumor
has it that Professor Raiffa has produced a book that solves this
problem. Bill Nordhaus has been heard to say, "I never discount
utility, but I do discount value." If we are going to discount,
what sort of value should we use? Not knowing much economics,
and probably being better off because of it, we decided to bake
a look at some previous large scale regional management systems
to see how sensitive the cost-benefit ratio is to the discount
rate. This is really a variant of the retrospective case study
approach. Actually, this whole paper was prompted by a brief
note we read in some scholarly journal (TIME and STERN come to
mind) that if the Indians who sold Manhattan Island for $24 had
put the money into a London bank and left it there for the past
350 years, they would have accrued more interest than the entire
state of New York is worth. This had apparently been calculated
from the prevailing interest rates in London banks during the
past 350 years. Turning the tables, this means that really the
Dutch traders got a very poor deal on their money. Instead of
buying some useless open air storeroom for long-houses, they
should have put their money in the bank. Any good operations
researcher could have done a cost-benefit analysis and told the
Dutch traders to hold on to their money and buy Spanish doubloons
instead. Sinceour scholarly journal didn't give all the facts
of the Manhattan purchase,we decided to rework it from a new
point of view. For a series of discounting rates, we will see
how much Manhattan would have to be worth now to have made it a
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good deal. Furthermore, we will see how sensitive the current
value of the purchase is to the discounting rate.
Unfortunately, Manhattan was bought a long time ago, 350
years, and some people might think that is a bit too long to
worry about. God knows IIASA only runs on 5-year agreements.
Therefore, we have also looked at two other, more recent, similar
investments, the Louisiana Purchase, which was bought from
Napoleon when he had cash flow problems for 27 million dollars
in 1803, and the purchase of Alaska from Russia by the United
States in 1867 for 7 million dollars. These two purchases, like
,
the purchase of Manhattan, have been often touted as some of the
best buys ever made (except, of course, for Xerox stocks in the
early days of the company). Table 1 presents the results.
Table 1. Value of the original investment at differing interest
rates. All prices in dollars per acre.
Land Acquisition
Year purchased
Price paid
Interest rate
1%
3%
5%
7%
9%
11%
Manhattan
Island
1626
$24
$.04
$40
$33,000
$24,000,000
$10 billion
$8 trillion
Louisiana
Purchase
1803
$27,000,000
$.28
$8.11
$207
$5,661
$140,000
$3,000,000
Alaska
1867
$7,000,000
$.05
$.45
$3.47
$26.66
$205
$1,466
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The results in Table 1 are quite striking. Even for the
purchase of Alaska, only 108 years ago, the value of the land
goes up nearly an order of magnitude with a 2% change in the
interest rate. The money paid for Manhattan, which could have
been compounding interest for 350 years, goes up about three
orders of magnitude for every 2% change in the interest rate. It
is thus obvious that for any renewable resource -- which means
a long time horizon -- small changes in the discount rate can
have very large effects on the cost-benefit ratio. Returning
to the original question, what are the appropriate discount
rates? For Manhattan it is obvious that the land values fall
between $33,000 and $24,000,000 per acre. Thus, 5-7% would be
appropriate. For the Louisiana purchase, the value/acre probably
falls between $207 and $5,661, so again 5-7% seems appropriate.
The value of land in Alaska is a bit harder to assess, but $205
per acre seems clearly to be an upper limit, with $.45 or $3.47
being a reasonable lower limit. Thus, 5-9% seems appropriate.
However, the purchase price is in original dollars, at least
for the Louisiana Purchase and Alaska, so the calculated in-
terest rate is not inflation free. If we chose 6% as an
appropriate discount rate, we have to subtract the average in-
flation rate. This probably brings the actual discount rate to
between 1-3%. We don't wish to actually prescribe a discount
rate, the table in this paper should speak for itself. When one
is managing any renewable resource, discounting should be viewed
with a suspicious eye.
